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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBIN L. HOUGH,
Plaintiff and Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
Supreme Court
No. 860025

vs.
JOEL E. COLLEYf
Defendant and Appellant
and Cross-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ISSUES .PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Did the Court err in finding that a

ISSUE

partnership existed between the parties.
ISSUE

2:

If a partnership did exist was defendant

obligated to provide the money while plaintiff was only obligated
to provide "services."

ISSUE

3:

Did the court err in distributing the

proceeds from the sale of the property on an equal basis or
should defendant first be reimbursed for the obligations he
incurred and contributions he made in excess of any made by
plaintiff.
ISSUE

4:

If a partnership existed did plaintiff

breach the terms of that partnership.
ISSUE

5:

Is it appropriate for the courts in this

state to grant a legal status to a private arrangement substituting for the institution of marriage.
ISSUE

6;

Should equity reward plaintiff for her

deleterious conduct and if so, in what amount?

STATUTES

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED:
Section 48-1-3

"Partnership" defined.

A partner-

ship is an association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners a business for profit.
Section 48-1-4
of a partnership.

Rules for determining the existence

In determining whether a partnership exists

these rules shall apply

-2-

(2)

Joint tenancy, tenancy in commonf tenancy by en-

tireties , joint propertyf common property, or part ownership,
does not of itself establish a partnership whether such co-owners
do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property
•

• •

Section 48-1-15
of partners.

Rules determining rights and duties

Text appears in the Addendum.

Section 48-1-37

Rules for distribution.

Text

appears in the Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

Nature of the Case.
i.

.

rf

Although this case received a "D" designation from
the Salt Lake County Clerk, it is not a divorce action.
Plaintiff originally filed for divorce alleging a common
law marriage in Galveston, Texas.

R. 2-3.

Plaintiff later

amended her complaint claiming, additionally, that there was a
partnership with defendant and asked for an accounting and
dissolution.

R. 19-37.

Defendant answered and counterclaimed

denying the existence of both the common-law marriage and the
partnership but alleged that if there was a partnership defendant

-3-

should have judgment against plaintiff for the amount by which
his contributions exceeded hers.

R. 41-49, 160-164.

Thereafter

plaintiff amended her complaint a second time and alleged that a
common law marriage had occurred either in Texas, Pennsylvania,
Montana or Colorado, but she was apparently not sure just where.
R.

835-836.

The trial court dismissed plaintiff's claim of a

common-law marriage, no cause of action, but found that there was
a partnership relating to certain parcels of real property purchased after the parties commenced residing in the State of Utah.
The court determined that plaintiff's obligation to the partnership was to provide only services but that the defendant was
obligated to provide all of the money.

The Court ordered the

real property sold and the proceeds used to pay off some, but not
all, of the mortgages relating to those properties; the balance
of the funds, if any, were to be divided equally between the
parties.

R. 1082-1083.

The Court ordered the partnership

terminated and the properties divided as of March 11, 1985, the
date of the court's memorandum decision.
Ill, p. 11-12.

R. 938-940*

T. Vol.

Defendant appeals from the court's finding of a

partnership and the resulting distribution.

Plaintiff appeals

from the court's denial of her claim of a common-law marriage.
2.

Statement of Facts.
Plaintiff and defendant commenced living together

in Galveston, Texas in August, 1971 while both were students at

-4-

the University of Texas. At that time plaintiff was unemployed
and remained so throughout her association with defendant in
Texas.

The agreement between the parties was to share expenses

and utilities.

T. Vol. I, p. 6-8.

a sexual relationship developed,
change. T. Vol. I, p. 44.

Although within a few weeks,
the parties1 agreement did not

In the spring of 1972, plaintiff re-

ceived his medical degree and moved to Philadelphia.

Plaintiff

subsequently graduated in Occupational Therapy and joined defendant in Philadelphia after residing for several months in
Indianapolis.

Plaintiff obtained employment as an occupational

therapist, defendant was employed as a medical doctor.
I, p. 120.

T. Vol.

Thereafter, the parties pursued their individual

careers in Pennsylvania, Montana, Arkansas and Colorado before
coming to Utah.

T. Vol. II, p. 105-106.

Defendant arrived here

in December, 1975; plaintiff in early 1976.

While in Utah the

parties continued to pursue their separate careers.
p. 105, 128, 137, 286.

T. Vol. II,

Plaintiff, however, became dissatisfied

with being an occupational therapist and in the spring of 1978,
changed her career to that of a realtor.

She made her first real

estate sale in the "latter part of 1978."

T. Vol. I, p. 70-71.

Since then she has been highly successful in that field.
I, p. 152.

T. Vol.

After arriving in Utah, the parties commenced

Plaintiff described her relationship with defendant at that
point as "very heated". T. Vol. I, p. 8.

-5-

purchasing real property located primarily in this State.

The

property was originally titled in their joint names under an
agreement, according to the defendant, wherein plaintiff was to
provide either property or cash of an equal value as she became
able to do so.

T. Vol. II, p. 128, 305. A portion of the pur-

chase price was borrowed from the retirement trust of defendant's
professional corporation.

T. Vol. IIy p. 132, 306; Ex. 94. The

balance was either purchased by mortgage or contract.

Although

plaintiff initially managed some of the Utah properties, a
professional manager was soon hired who assumed most of the
responsibilities relating to the properties.

T. Vol. I, p. 59.

The parties continued to reside together until October 30, 1981.
They had no children.

T. Vol. I, p. 65. Throughout their

association, defendant provided a substantial majority of the
funds.

T. Vol. II, p. 337, 338. After separation, defendant

paid $146,247.00, to maintain the properties.
172-173.

T. Vol. II, p.

Plaintiff paid only $4,200.00, T. Vol. I, p. 173,

although during that same period of time she acquired substantial
assets in her own name.

T. Vol. I, p. 128-130, 135-136, 179-182.

This action was filed in June, 1982.

Defendant married his

present wife in December, 1982 and now has one.son.

-6-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

There is no evidence that the parties intended to create
a partnership; ratherr they were two college students who decided
to live together•

In any eventf the terms of the "partnership,"

as found by the court, are contrary to the law and are unsupported by the record.
The distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the
property fails to conform with the statutes of this state and
fails to give the defendant credit for his excess contributions
and the personal obligations he incurred.
An award to plaintiff based upon her cohabitation with
defendant adversely impacts society and the institution of
marriage.

Since this state has abolished common law marriage and

has refused "no fault" divorces it should not sanction private
arrangements which substitute for the institution of marriage.
The plaintiff contributed little to the arrangement,
provided no "wifely duties" and actually enhanced her career
through defendant.

She amassed substantial assets in her own

name while defendant was forced to expend his funds to acquire
and then preserve the properties.

Equity, therefore, should not

reward plaintiff for her conduct.

Rather, as a minimum, plain-

tiff should reimburse defendant for the contributions he made.

-7-

ARGUMENT

I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT A PARTNERSHIP
EXISTED BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
Since this is an equitable matter 2 this Court may weigh
the facts as well as the lawf Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61
(Utah 1981), West v. West, 16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1965),
and may set aside the judgment where the court has misapplied the
law or its findings are clearly against the weight of evidence,
Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982).

Defendant con-

tends that such is the case here.
The court found that the parties were partners "under
circumstances where each of the partners committed his or her
total time, talent and efforts to the partnership."

R. 1078.

The court further found that, "it was understood and agreed that
the plaintiff would devote all of her time and talents to the
property and defendant would contribute money, but that both
would share on an equal basis."

R. 1079.

Defendant submits that

these two findings are internally inconsistent with one another
and that neither are supported by competent evidence in this
case.

As such, this Court should reverse the trial court.

Plaintiff asked for an equitable division of the properties
and for an accounting, R. 35. See R. 4 28.
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A#

There was no association of a business for profit

between plaintiff and defendants

A partnership is defined, in

the Uniform Partnership Act, as an "association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit,"
Section 48-1-3 U.C.A.

That Act is in force in each of the States

in which the parties cohabitated.

See, e.g. Ark Stat, §65-106,

C.R.S. §7-60-106; M.C.A. §35-10-201; 59 Pa. C.S.A. §311(a);
Vernon's Ann-Tex. Civ. Stat. Art, 6132(b), §6.
There was no written partnership agreement, T. Vol. I,
p. 143, and plaintiff presented no evidence that the parties
operated a business for profit.

Plaintiff testified that the

"agreement" began in Galveston in the early Spring of 1972, "the
date or the evening that we went to see Bob Creason." T. Vol. I,
3
p. 144.
Since plaintiff was an unemployed college student with
no particular skills, however, there could not have been an intent between the parties to carry on a business for profit in the
State of Texas.

Rather, as plaintiff admitted, the agreement

between the parties was simply that they would share expenses.

Plaintiff's version of the Creason meeting was that the
parties were going to make "a committed relationship," be
faithful to each other and "combine all of our financial
resources and our emotional and our physical resources." T.
Vol. I, p. 9-10. Defendant's version was that the Creason
meeting was to discuss the social ramifications of the fact
that they were living together without being married. T.
Vol. II, p. 86-87.

-9-

T. Vol* I, p. 6,

In order to create a partnership, however, the

purpose of the association must be for gain.
Partnerships §6.8, p. 88 (2d ed. 1960).

1 S. Rowley on

Simply sharing expenses

does not create a partnership.
There was no evidence that the parties ever entered into
an agreement that they would carry on a business for profit as
co-owners in any of the other States in which they resided.

The

evidence merely showed that they continued to live together,
share expenses and pursue their individual careers.
Plaintiff appeared to be confused concerning where the
"agreement" took place.

She subsequently stated that the conver-

sation creating the "agreement" had initiated in Philadelphia and
not in Texas as she had earlier testified.

She stated:

The conversation initiated in
Philadelphia . . . it was our understanding, that all of our efforts, our
financial efforts, our physical efforts,
our intellectual efforts, were to be combined so that we - - our unit could grow.
It was for the betterment for both of us.
T. Vol. I, p. 55.
Rather than a business for profit, plaintiff testified that the
objective of the living arrangement was tax savings, T. Vol. I,
p. 20. When asked where she believed she had entered into the
partnership, plaintiff responded, "I believe that our marriage

-10-

was our partnership."

T. Vol. I, p. 121.

Defendant submits that iff as plaintiff testified, their
"marriage" was their partnership, the court should have found
that there was no partnership since it found that there was no
marriage.

An agreement to live together and share expenses,

standing alone, does not manifest the intent necessary to create
a partnership.

See, Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 164 N.J. Super. 162,

395 A.2d 913 (1978).

Since the evidence required to support a

finding of a partnership is wholly lacking, that finding must be
reversed.
B.

If any agreement existed it had to have been created

in the State of Utah.

The court found that the parties had

acquired substantial real estate in the State of Utah and as to
that property only found that they were partners.

R. 1078. The

court refused, however, to state where the partnership was
formed.

T. Vol. Ill, p. 14. 5
The parties had no intent to come to the State of Utah

until late 1975. T. Vol. II, p. 117-119.

In addition, plaintiff

4
Although plaintiff contended that defendant referred to her
as "partner" she admitted that such a term was a nickname
such as, "honey, darling, or my little cabbage." T. Vol. I,
p. 122. Based on the court's ruling, defendant probably
should be grateful that the court did not decree that he was
also a cabbage.
When asked where the partnership was formed, the Court
replied, "Where? Some place between Texas and Utah. Don't
think I have to make a finding on that." T. Vol. Ill, p. 14.
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had no expertise in real estate until at least the latter part of
1978,

T. Vol, Iy p. 70.

Thus, any agreement to acquire property

in Utah must have occurred after the parties arrived here.
The only testimony relating to a discussion concerning
the acquisition of property in the State of Utah was presented by
defendant*

Defendant testified that there was an agreement among

the parties that he would borrow the funds for the acquisition of
the properties from his corporation's retirement trust, or supply
his own funds, based upon plaintiff's promise to manage the
property.

Plaintiff further promised, according to defendant,

that she would ultimately acquire sufficient properties with her
own funds and place defendant's name on those properties or else
pay defendant for half of the price of the properties so that
their contributions would be equal.

T. Vol. II, p. 128, 305.

That testimony of defendant was never rebutted by plaintiff.
Thus, defendant submits, the only basis upon which properties
could have been acquired in Utah was pursuant to the conversation
to which defendant testified.

It would have been impossible in

Texas, Pennsylvania, Montana, Arkansas or Colorado for the
parties to enter into the type of agreement characterized by the
court since there was no intent at that time to come to Utah and
plaintiff possessed no skills or expertise in the field of real
estate.

-12-

C.

The mere acquisition of property does not create a

Partnership,

The trial court apparently based its finding of a
*

partnership upon the "manner in which the parties purchased the
properties" and by other documents which reflected their "common
ownership."

R. 1078. Joint tenancy or common ownership of prop-

erty, however,

does not of itself establish a partnership

whether or not profits made by the use of the property are
shared.

Section 48- l-4(2)f U.C.A.

It is well established that

two or more persons may be co-owners of land and not be partners,
since co-tenancy of real property is not the same as a partnership.

1 S. Rowley, supra, at 134. See, Clark v. Sidway, 142

U.S. 682, 12 S.Ct. 327, 35 L.Ed. 1157 (1892).
The Pennsylvania courts have stated that even though two
people own property as joint tenants, in order to be a partnership there must be an element of carrying on a business or
enterprise for a profit.
A. 638 (1926).

Comstock v. Thompson,. 286 Pa. 457, 133

See also, Laughner v. Wally, 269 Pa. 5, 122 A.

105 (1920); Zuback v. Bakmaz, 346 Pa. 279, 29 A.2d 473 (1943).
Rowley has further stated:

"The test of sharing profits so far

as they are derived from the use of property is not alone controlling.

1 S. Rowley, supra at 133.

In Brown v. Miller, 111

Colo. 327, 141 P.2d 682 (1943), the court stated:

"mere joint

ownership of land does not create a partnership even though the
profits are shared."
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Merely owning property with another does not create a
partnership; therefore, since the record is devoid of any other
evidence that a partnership existed, the court's reliance upon
the form of the title to the property is misplaced.
II
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD DEVOTE ALL
OF HER TIME AND TALENTS TO THE PROPERTY AND DEFENDANT
WOULD CONTRIBUTE MONEY BUT THAT BOTH WOULD SHARE ON
AN EQUAL BASIS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
As set forth above, the defendant contends that the
Court's Finding No. 6, is inconsistent with its Finding No. 3.
In addition, defendant submits that the Court's Finding No. 6 is
totally unsupported by any evidence.
A.

The plaintiff, herself, did not contend that her

obligation to the relationship was limited to time and talents
only.

The testimony of the plaintiff is replete with statements

that her obligation, or commitment, to the relationship included
a financial commitment.

Although defendant had a different ver-

sion of his discussions with plaintiff,

the court's finding that

plaintiff was only required to devote her "time and talents" to
the property but that defendant was obligated to contribute
money, is contrary even to plaintiff's testimony.

Referring to

their relationship in Texas, plaintiff stated:

Defendant denied there was ever a discussion about being
partners. T. Vol. II, p. 82-83.
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We both contributed everything.
contributed all of our finances,
contributed all of our time,' all
our talent, all of our efforts.
Vol. I, p. 41 (emphasis added).

We
we
of
R.

Plaintiff testified that, pursuant to the conversation
in Pennsylvania, the parties were to combine their financial
efforts.

T. Vol. I, p. 55.
Later on the plaintiff stated:
It went - - we committed 100% of
everything, our finances, our mental, physical, emotional efforts up
to the time that we separated. We
still had a tremendous amount of
contact after that up until November, 1982 and still a lot of financial involvement, talking, but the
combination was not what it had been
prior to separation. Prior to our
separation it was 100%. T. Vol. I,
p. 175-176.
Plaintiff also stated that:
We combined all of our income into our
accounts, and all of our efforts, all
of our energies into a common pool."
T. Vol. I, p. 144.7

The testimony of plaintiff, herself, indicates that her understanding of the "agreement" between herself and the defendant

It is obvious, however, that the parties did not place all of
their income in a common pool. Although the parties maintained a joint account in each of the States in which they
resided, each also maintained a separate business account
which was the exclusive property of that party. T. Vol. II,
P. 96, 106, 110. Plaintiff, for instance, maintained the
Robin Hough, Occupational Therapist Account in Texas,
Pennsylvania, Montana, Colorado and Utah. T. Vol. I, p.
111-115. EX. 57, 68, 72.
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required her to contribute not only her time and talents, but
also her finances to their union.
B.

Plaintifffs obligation did not change.

There is no

testimony anywhere in the record to support the court's finding
that the plaintiff's contribution was limited to time and talent
while defendant assumed the obligation of contributing money.
fact, the testimony is precisely to the contrary.

In

When asked,

"Did the agreement ever change, so far as you understood it?
Plaintiff responded, "Never."

T. Vol. I, p. 44. Thus, if the

original agreement between the parties was that they would both
o

commit their total time, effort and talents

and if that agree-

ment never changed, the Court's Finding No. 6 that the agreement
did change and that defendant somehow became obligated to put up
the money while plaintiff only had to provide "time and talent"
is clearly erroneous.
Ill
IF THERE WAS A PARTNERSHIP, THE COURT ERRED IN
DISTRIBUTING THE NET PROCEEDS OF SALE ON A 50-50 BASIS
Defendant submits that the distribution of the proceeds
of sale on a 50-50 basis is contrary to the Utah Partnership Act
and in this case is patently inequitable to defendant.
A.

Partnership distributions are controlled by statute.

The rules governing the rights and duties of partners are set

Defendant denied that there ever was such an agreement;
rather, he stated that, the parties were each to pursue their
own careers. T. Vol. II, p. 105-106, 191.
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forth in Section 48-1-15 U.C.A.

That section provides that in

the absence of an agreement to the contrary:
*

1.

Each partner will be repaid his contributions
either by way of capital or advances to the
partnership property and share equally in the
profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities are satisfied; and that the partners
should contribute towards the losses in
accordance to their share of the profits;

2.

The partnership must indemnify every partner
with respect to payments made and personal
liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the
ordinary and proper conduct of its business or
in the preservation of its business or
property;

3.

A partner who, in aid of the partnership,
makes any payments or advances beyond the
amount of capital which he agreed to contribute, shall be paid interest from the date of
the payment or advance.

Defendant submits that it is error and is contrary to
§48-1-15 U.C.A. for the court in this case to divide the proceeds
of sale equally between the parties.

In Knutson v. Lauer 627

P.2d 66 (Utah 1981), this Court reiterated that the partnership
must indemnify every partner in respect of payments made and
personal liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the ordinary
and proper conduct of business, or for the preservation of
property.
In Eardley v. Sammons, 8 Utah 2d 159, 330 P.2d 122
(1958), this Court held that it was error for the district court
to distribute "profits" without first indemnifying each of the
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partners for their payments and advances on behalf of the
partnership and without first repaying the sums owing in respect
to capital.

Each partner has the right, as between partners, to

be repaid advances and to be indemnified in respect to payments
made and personal liabilities incurred.

1 S. Rowley, supra §34

at 767.
The rules for distribution upon a dissolution of a
partnership are set forth in Section 48-1-37 U.C.A.

According to

that section the liabilities of the partnership rank in the order
of payment as follows:

1.

Those owing to creditors other than partners;

2.

Those owing to partners other than for capital
and profits;

3.

Those owing to partners in respect of capital;
and

4.

Those owing to partners in respect of profits.

That section further provides that partners shall contribute the amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities of the
partnership.
B.

A substantial portion of the funds to purchase the

properties were borrowed from the retirement trust of defendant's
corporation.

The method of acquisition of the properties by the

parties was for defendant to borrow a"portion of the funds from
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the retirement trust of his professional corporation*

T. Vol.

II, p» 132, 306. The notes signed by defendant, payable to the
pension trust, Ex. 94, represent a substantial obligation of the
Q

partnership, if there was a partnership.

Plaintiff's own Ex. 28

acknowledged that, as of December 30, 1980, there was at least
$54,630.00 owed to the Joel E. Colley, M.D., P.C., Retirement
Trust, secured by second mortgages on the properties with
interest payable annually at 12% to 15%. By 1981, defendant had
borrowed $104,820.55 from the retirement trust for the properties.

Ex. 29, T. Vol. II, p. 330. The court, however, refused

to order the repayment of those funds except in the instances
where a mortgage had also been signed by plaintiff.

If the trial

court's decision is allowed to stand/ those obligations will have
to be repaid by defendant personally, without any contribution by
plaintiff, or else defendant will have to pay $60,000 to $80,000
in taxes.

T. Vol. II, p. 330-331.

C.

Defendant paid a substantial sum from his own pocket

to preserve the subject properties.

After the parties separated

the defendant was required to advance $146,247.00, for the purpose of preserving the subject properties.

T. Vol. II, p.

Because of the nature of the profit sharing plan, defendant
was the only one authorized by the plan to borrow funds from
it. T. Vol. II, p. 132.
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172-173; Ex. 111.

During that same period of time the

plaintiff paid a miserly $4f200.00 for property maintenance.
Vol. I, p. 173*

T.

In addition, the unrefuted testimony of Mr.

Miller, the accountant, showed that during the relationship,
defendant contributed approximately $228,356.48, more than plaintiff. Ex. 111.

That figure is most generous to plaintiff giving

her credit for contributions of $101,489.76, the maximum amount
that she could have contributed to the relationship during that
period of time, although only $61,000.00 worth of deposits from
plaintiff to the joint account were located by Mr. Miller.
Defendant, on the other hand, had verified contributions of at
least $394,312.00.
D.

T. Vol. II, p. 338-341.

There was no agreement that plaintiff would be com-

pensated in wages or for the time spent in the partnership.
Plaintiff testified that there was no agreement that she would be
compensated for any services she provided in the management of
the properties.

T. Vol. I, p. 146-147.

This Court has recog-

nized that a partner is not entitled to any remuneration for its
services in the absence of an agreement by the partners to that
effect.

Knutson v. Lauer, supra, Chambers v. Simms, 13 Utah 2d

371, 374 P.2d 841 (1962).

In Keller v. Wixom, 123 Utah 103, 255

P.2d 118 (1953), this Court stated that, as a matter of law,

Of those funds, $119,581 was paid from January 1, 1982 to
December 31, 1984, the balance was paid during November and
December 1981. T. Vol. II, p. 340.
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partners receive no compensation for acting in the partnership
business other than splitting the profits unless there is an
express agreement or provision for such remuneration*

Utah Law

provides that no partner is entitled to remuneration for acting
in the partnership's affairs.

Section 48-1-15(6) U.C.A.

It is

clear, therefore, that plaintiff has no entitlement to any wages
or remuneration since there was no agreement between the parties
that she would be so compensated.

As a result, if there was a

partnership, and if plaintiff is entitled to a distribution from
that partnership, it must come pursuant to either §48-1-15 or
§48-1-37 LLC.A,
Applying those rules to the instant case, the obligations other than those owed to partners must first be paid;
thereafter, the obligations to partners other than for capital
and profits must be paid.

It is only after those obligations are

paid that capital contributions are repaid and it is only after
capital is paid that any profits are distributed.
Lauer, supra; Eardley v. Sammons, supra.

Knutson v.

Thus, the money owed to

the retirement trust, Ex. 94, must be repaid first, as an obligation owed to a creditor.

Next, the plaintiff must be reimbursed

for his advances, Ex. Ill, and then the capital contributions are
returned.

The court made no finding, however, concerning the

amount contributed by the parties, and plaintiff presented no
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evidence in that regard.

Thus, an essential element of plain-

tiff's case was lacking.11

In Sugg v. Morris, 392 P.2d 313,

(Alaska 1964), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the plaintiff, an unmarried "spouse", had the burden of showing not only
the combined monetary amount contributed by the parties toward
the purchase price of the property but also the precise amount
contributed by herself.

Failing that, she was not entitled to a

portion of the property.

In Baum v. McBride, 152 Neb. 152, 40

N.W.2d 649 (1950), the court held that the burden of providing an
accounting is upon the plaintiff in a partnership dissolution and
if there is no proof the claim must fail.
her burden.

Plaintiff did not meet

The only evidence of contribution was presented by

defendant which showed that his personal contribution exceeded
plaintiff's by $228,356.48, without considering the funds he
personally borrowed from the retirement trust.

If there was a

partnership, he should be indemnified by plaintiff for his excess
contributions.
IV
PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEVOTE ALL OF HER TIME, TALENT
AND ENERGIES TO THE SUBJECT UNION
The evidence is clear that plaintiff did not devote all
of her time, talents and energies to the "union"; rather, plaintiff was vigorously pursuing her own career, first in occupa-

Defendant moved for dismissal but the court denied his
motion. T. Vol, II, p. 76.
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tional therapy and then in real estate.

The parties lived

separate livesf took separate vacations and existed in their own
separate spheres.

T. Vol. II, p. 105y 137. Jean Wertz, the next

door neighbor, testified that plaintiff and defendant came and
went separately and that on only rare occasions were they seen
together.

T. Vol. II, p. 193-197.

Defendant testified that al-

though he assisted plaintiff in becoming a licensed real estate
person their relationship was such that she actively pursued her
career and he pursued his.

T. Vol. II, p. 128.

"our careers kept us going separately."

Defendant stated

T. Vol. II, p. 181.

The plaintiff testified that she had foregone "some"
commissions with relation to some of the parcels of property that
had been purchased but she could not identify the amount of commission nor the specific parcels of property on which no commission was received.

T. Vol. I, p. 68-69.

Further, plaintiff had

no idea concerning the cost of maintenance or the negative cash
flow generated by the properties.

T. Vol. I, p. 100-101. She

could not state how much, if any, of her income went into the
"property account."

T. Vol, I, p. 134.

In short, any evidence

that she knew anything about the properties or that she had devoted any substantial portion of her time to their acquisition or
maintenance was totally lacking.

In fact, the plaintiff admitted

that a property manager was hired shortly after her first real
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estate sale and that within a few months the manager was not only
collecting the rents but also writing the checks to the mortgage
company and doing most, if not all, of the accounting.

T. Vol.

I, p. 59, 71-72.
It is obvious, therefore, that for a considerable time
prior to separation, plaintiff had no active management of the
properties.

There is no evidence that she contributed any sub-

stantial services to those properties and certainly there is no
evidence that plaintiff devoted all her time and talents to the
property during any period of their relationship.

After October

30 r 1981, plaintiff made no effort to devote any time or energy
to the properties.
Vol. II, p. 175.

As defendant stated, "She just left."

T.

Thereafter, plaintiff's efforts were directed

solely toward the acquisition of wealth and personal gratification.

T. Vol. II, p. 313, Ex. 73-76, 86-91, 100-104.12

The

defendant, meanwhile, was forced to maintain the properties by
advancing additional funds for mortgage payments, property maintenance, and other expenses.
A.
received.

Ex. 111.

Plaintiff did not account for all of the funds she
During 1981, plaintiff kept, from her broker, Gump &

For example, during November 21, 1983 through November 25,
1983, plaintiff was variously "laying in bed with Curtis or
laying in front of the fireplace with Curtis", a school
teacher from Connecticut. Ex. 91 p. 102-103.
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Ayers, a $6,450.00 commission obtained from a real estate deal,
and put that money into her own pocket.
Ex. 78.

Plaintiff admitted so doing.

T. Vol. II, p. 260-261,

T. Vol. I. p. 149. The

plaintiff did not tell the defendant about the commission because
she knew that defendant would want her to use the money to repay
the loans from the retirement trust.

T. Vol. II, p. 260-261.

Mr. Ronald Radcliffe testified that he and plaintiff
began working on a transaction relating to property located in
Cedar Valley, Utah in 1980 or 1981; a date clearly prior to the
time the parties separated.

For that transaction, plaintiff

received $20,000.00 in cash as a "management fee"

which funds

were also kept by plaintiff and not paid to Gump & Ayers or used
to repay the debts relating to the properties.
149-150.

T. Vol. I, p.

In addition, plaintiff will continue to receive $500.00

per month for a period of sixty (60) months for "management" of
the properties.

Mr. Radcliffe testified, however, the plaintiff

does nothing for that fee.
It is obvious that plaintiff, on at least two occasions,
purloined real estate commissions that should have rightfully
been paid to her broker. 13
Although plaintiff contended that
the consulting fee was received after the parties separated, it

Plaintiff testified that there was no difference between what
she did to earn the "consulting" fee and what she would do to
earn a regular real estate commission. T. Vol. I, p. 150.
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was reported on her 1981 tax return*
computer statement.

Ex. 1, 1981 Return, p. 8 of

In any event, since the plaintiff began

working on the transaction prior to the date of separation, it
should be considered "work-in-process" for the "unit."

Once the

fees were received by plaintiff, however, rather than contribute
them to the maintenance of the properties, as defendant did with
his income, she used them for the acquisition of personal assets.
During 1982, plaintiff purchased a new Mercedes automobile for $28,000.00 cash, T. Vol. I, p. 130, a residence on
Kentucky Avenue, several rental properties, entered into various
partnerships with others for the acquisition of real property, T.
Vol> I, p« 128-130, and spent $10,000.00 - $15,000.00 remodeling
her newly purchased home.

During 1982, plaintiff also traveled

to Portland, Oregon, and Sydney, Australia, went on a fishing
trip to Montana, and visited her parents in Fort Worth, Texas.
R. 269. According to the figures of Mr. Miller, the accountant,
plaintiff's spendable income for 1982 was $31,543.00.

Ex. 115.

If one adds up the expenditures acknowledged by plaintiff, without even taking into account her ordinary living expenses for
that year, it is obvious that in 1982 the plaintiff spent a sum
of cash substantially in excess of $31,543.00.

The only logical

explanation for plaintiff's wealth and style of living in 1982 is
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that she had, for a substantial amount of time, been sequestering
funds from her real estate business and not contributing them to
the "unit".

Obviously, plaintiff was not devoting all of her

time and energy to the "partnership" as the court found she was
obligated to do.
B.

Plaintiff has acquired substantial assets in her own

name rather than supporting the subject properties.

Besides the

home, rental properties, and partnerships, plaintiff owns a Keogh
Plan, an IRA Plan, several Dean Witter accounts, receives the
$500 per month management fee and is also well established in her
real estate profession.

T. Vol. I, p. 128-130.

These assets

were all acquired prior to the date the court terminated the
partnership.

Thus, while defendant was putting his own money

into the preservation of the properties, plaintiff was acquiring
properties of her own and making deposits into her Keogh and IRA
accounts.

In fact, the evidence showed that at the end of 1983,

plaintiff had approximately $42,000.00 in her IRA account,
$29,000.00 in her Keogh account and $14,000.00 in her E.F. Hutton
account.

Ex. 102 to 104.

Plaintiff testified that she made

regular deposits to those accounts.

T. Vol. I, p. 203. Plain-

tiff clearly had the ability to contribute towards the properties
if she had chosen to do so.

See Ex. 100-101.

Rather than help-

ing the defendant, the plaintiff diminished the defendant's
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ability to preserve the properties by filing Lis Pendens on all
of them, thereby making them unsaleable*
8-18.

T. Vol. II, p. 312, R.

In addition, during that time, plaintiff also kept

approximately $5,100.00 from the proceeds of a parcel of property
located on Seventh East, although the checks were made payable to
plaintiff and defendant, jointly.

T. Vol. II, p. 58, Ex. 81.

Plaintiff admitted signing defendant's name to the checks, T.
Vol. I. p. 104.
C.

A distribution to plaintiff based upon her time,

talents and services is in error.

If plaintiff is entitled to a

share of the profits, such a distribution is subordinate to a
return of defendant's advances and capital.

As Rowley has

stated:
Where one partner has contributed
capital and another services, the
one contributing the capital is
entitled to withdraw its value.
1 S. Rowley, supra at 453.
While under some circumstances personal services may
constitute a capital contribution to a partnership, there must be
an agreement to that effect; otherwise, a partner who contributes
services is not entitled to share in the partnership capital upon
dissolution.

Schymanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1983).
In the instant case there was no evidence of such an agreement. 14

See Section II of this Brief.
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It has been stated:

A partner contributing only ser-

vices and no capital, is ordinarily entitled to no share of
capital on dissolution, the capital is returned to the partner
supplying it.
(1943).

Tiffany v. Short, 22 Cal. 2d 531, 139 P.2d 939

The partner contributing only services is limited to his

share of the profits of the enterprise as compensation for his
services.

Hunter v. Allen, 174 Or. 261, 147 P.2d 213, modified

on other grounds, 148 P.2d 936, (1944).
Generally where one partner contributes the capital of
the firm while another contributes skill and labor, the partner
who made the capital contribution is entitled, on dissolution, to
repayment of such capital before any distribution of profits is
made.

A partner who furnishes no capital, but who contributes

merely his time, skill and services, is not entitled on dissolution to any part of the original firm capital, but must look for
his compensation for such time and services to his share of the
profits.

Vassallo v. Sexauer, 22 Mich. App. 188, 177 N.W.2d 470

(1970); Bass v. Daetwyler, 305, S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1957); Baum v
McBride, supra.
In the instant case, the trial court failed to determine
whether or not there were any profits to distribute and further
erred in failing to return to defendant the capital he had contributed.

Section 48-1-37 U.C.A.
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There was no competent

evidence that the parties had agreed that plaintiff could contribute services in lieu of cash.

Plaintiff presented no account-

ing to the Court showing what services she rendered, the amount
of time involved or the value of what she did.

In other

words, there was no basis upon which the Court could evaluate
plaintiff's contribution to the "unit", nor could the Court
properly determine that the financial contribution of defendant
was matched by the efforts and services of plaintiff.
Although one who provides only services to a partnership
may be entitled to a division of profitsy no such division is
proper until after all obligations have been paid and all contributions and advances have been returned.
Plaintiff relied upon the case of Craig v. Hamilton, 518
P.2d 539 (Kan. 1984), for the proposition that even though her
contribution to the "unit" was less than defendant's she wasf
nevertheless, entitled to an equal distribution of the property.
Such, however, is not the holding of that case.

In that case

there was a written partnership agreement, therefore, the threshold issue presented in this case, i.e., the existence of a partnership, was not in dispute.

That agreement provided that two of

See Section II of this Brief.
Defendant testified that plaintiff did nothing to maintain or
oversee the properties. T. Vol. II, p. 191.
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the partners would contribute "equipment, technical knowledge,
skill and experience," and Hamilton would contribute cash.

Upon

dissolution, Hamilton was offered his capital contribution plus
10% of the profits.

Hamilton contended, however, and the court

there found, that he was entitled to an equal share, or onethird, of the profits.
Unlike the trial court here, the Kansas court recognized
that the partners were entitled to a return of capital before
profits were distributed.
The trial court's award to plaintiff of one-half of the
proceeds from the sale of the real property is clearly error.
V
THE RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED COHABITORS IS
ONE OF FIRST IMPRESSION IN UTAH
Assuming that there is no partnership, the underlying
issue in this case then becomes what, if any, rights or obligations do unmarried cohabitating parties have in Utah with
relation to property acquired and obligations incurred during, or
as a result of, that cohabitation.
Plaintiff's theories of recovery, other than common law
marriage, were partnership and unjust enrichment.

Plaintiff

presented no evidence, however, relating to the unjust enrichment
claim.

-31-

Over the years, various theories have been advanced in
an attempt to adjudicate the rights of unmarried, cohabitating
adults.

The most prominent case is Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d

660, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976), wherein the plaintiff alleged an express contract with the defendant contending,
inter alia, that she gave up a lucrative career so that she could
provide domestic services to defendant in exchange for defendant's promise of support*

In the instant case, however, the

plaintiff does not claim an agreement for future support.

In

addition, she performed none of the traditional wifely duties.
Household chores were done by a maid, cleaning lady and various
other people.

T. Vol. II, p. 182. The plaintiff did not assist

the defendant in furthering his medical career.
737.

T. Vol. II, p.

Rather, the plaintiff enhanced her own career through the

efforts of the defendant.

T. Vol. I, p. 70-71, 152; Vol. II, p.

124-125.
In Marvin, the court upheld the claim of an express
contract and further stated that the plaintiff could, if she
wished, amend her complaint to also allege an implied agreement
of partnership.

In deciding an analogous case, however, the New

York Court of Appeals flatly rejected the implied contract theory
of Marvin finding it:
to be conceptually so amorphous as practically to
defy equitable enforcement and inconsistent with
the legislative policy enunciated in 1933 when
common-law marriages were abolished in New York.
Monroe v. Monroe, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 407 N.E.2d 438,
1980.
-32-

The New York court did, however, state it would recognize an
express contract for domestic services.

Id. at 441.

In Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 903
(1979) the court rejected the partnership theory in a case
between unmarried adults who had cohabitated for 15 years but did
find an express agreement for future support based on the facts
of that case. 17
It was held in Chambers v. Crawford, 150 So.2d 61
(La. App. 1963), that where the initial motive and purpose of the
parties1 coming together was cohabitation and where such relationship continued, there was no right of recovery based upon the
theory of a partnership.
It thus appears that, except for the gratuitous comments
in Harvin, the application of partnership principles between
unmarried cohabitants has been generally rejected, unless all of
the requirements of an express partnership agreement are clearly
met.
A.

An award to plaintiff would be contrary to the

public policy in the State of Utah.

The claim of a "partnership"

by plaintiff is really a back door approach to a common law
marriage since the issue here, as in most common law marriages,

Much of
Appeals
Ct.App.
Supreme

that opinion was founded upon the Illinois Court of
decision in Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454 (111.
1978), which was subsequently reversed by its
Court.
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is that of money, not matrimony.

If plaintiff is allowed to

prevail on her claim of entitlement to any of the property,
without making a significant contribution to its acquisition, it
would be tantamount to establishing common law marriage in the
State of Utah, at least for economic purposes.
In Rehak v, Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977),
the alleged "wife" brought an action in equity for a portion of
the property acquired during 18 years of cohabitation.

Affirming

a dismissal by the trial court, the Supreme Court stated:
It is well settled that neither a
court of law nor a court of equity
will lend its aid to either party to
a contract founded upon an illegal
or immoral consideration . • . The
parties being unmarried and the
appellant having admitted the fact
of cohabitation . . . this would
constitute immoral consideration.
See also, Wellmaker v. Roberts, 213 Ga. 740, 101 S.E.2d 712
(1958).
The plaintiff has admitted that she and the defendant
lived together, and that they had sexual intercourse together
prior to the time of any "agreement."

T. Vol. I, p. 7, 73-74.

She further admitted that the "agreement" to become "partners"
was arrived at after they started living together.
193.

T. Vol. I, p.

It appears, therefore, that plaintiff's claim is similarly

based on immoral consideration and should have been dismissed.
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Another case in point is Hewitt v, Hewittf 77 111. 2d
49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).

There the Illinois Supreme Court met

head on the various philosophies of the case of Marvin v. Marvin,
supra.

In Hewitt, the plaintiff was an unmarried mother of three

who sued the children's father, with whom she had lived for 15
years, to recover an equal share of the property accumulated by
the parties during that period.

Unlike the instant case, the

plaintiff there claimed that she had devoted her efforts to the
defendant's professional education and the establishment of his
practice.

The Illinois Supreme Court, nevertheless, held that

the woman's claim was unenforceable for the reason that it
contravened the public policy of the state which disfavored the
grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.

Noting that common law marriages in

Illinois are invalid, the Court observed, that Illinois "appears
to be one of the three states retaining fault grounds for dissolution of marriage."

Id. at 1210. The court went on to state

that "certainly a significantly stronger pro-marriage policy is
manifest in that action (fault grounds for marriage dissolution)
which appears to reaffirm the traditional doctrine that marriage
is a civil contract between three parties - the husband, the wife
and the state."

"This seems to us", the court continued,

"another indication that public policy disfavors private contrac-
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tual alternatives to marriage."

Id.

The Illinois Supreme Court

was concerned that the practical effect of allowing the "wife" to
recover would be the reinstatement of common law marriage.
at 1211.

Id.

Citing to Marvin and other similar cases, the court

stated that commentators have expressed the concern that "the
effect of these cases is to reinstate common law marriage in
California after it has been abolished by the legislature."

The

Illinois Court criticized the approach utilized by the California
Court in Marvin and stated that the issue of whether property
rights accrued to unmarried cohabitants cannot be regarded realistically as merely a contract law problem:
There are major public policy
questions involved in determining
whetherf under what circumstancesf
and to what extent it is desirable
to accord some type of legal status
to claims arising from such relationships. Of substantially greater
importance than the rights of the
immediate parties, is the impact of
such recognition upon our society
and the institution of marriage.
Id. at 1207. 1 8
Further the Court stated thatf with relation to Marvin:
it would seem more candid to acknowledge the return of varying forms of
common law marriage then to continue
displaying the naivete we believe
The Court was concerned that if legal rights closely
resembling those arising from conventional marriages can be
acquired by those who deliberately choose to enter into
illicit or meritorious relationships, the formation of such
relationships might be encouraged and that might weaken the
marriage foundation of our family based society.
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involved in the assertion that there
are involved in these relationships
contracts separate and independent
from the sexual activity.
Id. at
1209.
Continuing the Court stated:
the issue, realistically, is whether
it is appropriate for this Court to
grant a legal status to a private
arrangement substituting for the
institution of marriage sanctioned
by the state. Id.
That is the issue squarely before this Court.
Defendant believes that the policy considerations outlined by the Illinois Supreme Court are also applicable to the
State of Utah and that the reasoning of the Hewitt court should
be adopted here.

The State of Utah is a strong family based

based society and has a firm policy favoring marriage.

In Hilton

v. Roylance, 25 Utah 129, 69 P. 660 (1902), this Court observed
that "marriage is the foundation of civilization and of the
social system." Id. at 663. The State of Utah has refused to
adopt the concept of no fault dissolution of marriage and is,
with Illinois, one of the few remaining States, to do so.19
At
the turn of the century, this Court stated that the marriage
contract is not subject, like other contracts, to dissolution by
mutual consent of the parties, or in any other way, except

The other State is South Dakota.
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through the sovereign power of the state.

Hilton v. Roylancey

supra. That strong and continuing public policy was reaffirmed in
1986 when the State Senate rejected a bill that would have added
irreconcilable differences to the grounds for divorce in Utah.
Minutes of Judiciary Standing Committee, Utah State Senate, Feb.
3, 1986y H.B. 33. Utah does not allow common law marriages.
Hendrich v. Anderson, 191 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1951); Johnson v.
Johnsonf 116 Utah 27, 207 P.2d 1036 (1949); In re Vetas' Estate,
110 Utah 187, 170 P.2d 183 (1946). 20

Although leniency is often

shown to unmarried "spouses" in workmen's compensation cases in
other jurisdictions. See, H. Clark, supra, p. 50, this Court has
consistently refused to do so.

Crenshaw v. Industrial Comm., 712

P.2d 245 (Utah 1985); Wengert v. Double 00 Hot Shot, 657 P.2d
1343 (Utah 1983). 21
Thus, it is apparent that, as has
Illinois, the State of Utah has consistently asserted a strong
interest in the institution of marriage and of the family.

See,

In ret Goalen, 30 Utah 2d 27, 572 P.2d 1028 (1973), Hilton v.

The overwhelming trend in the United States is against common
law marriages, H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, p. 45-46
(1968) , which have often been characterized as a "fruitful
source of perjury and fraud." See, Estate of Gavula, 417
A.2d 168 (Pa. 1980).
This Court stated that it has consistently held that a valid
marriage is a prerequisite to receiving worker's death
benefits.
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Roylancef supra.

It would be inappropriate, based upon the

public policy of this state to afford legal status to claims
arising from a meretricious relationship.

If this Court allows

the plaintiff to recover/ the defendant submits that that will be
tantamount to sanctioning common law marriages for economic
purposes and that it will promote illicit relationships and
subvert the state's consistently asserted interest in the
marriage relationship.
B.

Equity should not reward plaintiff.

Defendant

submits that it is inequitable to saddle him with all of the
debts owed to the retirement trust.

In addition, to allow

plaintiff to just walk away and then utilize her income for the
acquisition of personal assets while defendant was required to
contribute a substantial sum towards the maintenance of the
propertiesf and then for the court to refuse to require the
plaintiff to repay defendant for his contributions is contrary to
the basic principals of equity and fairness.
1.
hands.

Plaintiff does not come into court with clean

A portion of plaintiff's claim involved the willful vio-

lation of the criminal laws of this state.
U.C.A..

Section 76-7-104

The court's finding in Stevens v. Andersony 75 Ariz.

331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953), that the unmarried, cohabitating
parties had violated the "permanent public policy of all society
and the express criminal statutes of the state" is applicable
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here.

In addition, plaintiff concealed a portion of her funds

from defendant and refused to contribute toward the maintenance
of the properties even though asked to do so.
313.

T. Vol. II, p.

It cannot be said, therefore, that either before or after

separation, she dealt with defendant in fairness and good conscience; obviously, plaintiff's contributions to the relationship
22
were minimal, but the benefits she received were substantial.
Plaintiff did not come into court with clean hands, therefore,
equity should not assist her.

Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156

(Utah 1976).
2.

If plaintiff is entitled to anything at all,

it should be in proportion to the contribution she made to the
properties.

If equity dictates that plaintiff should receive

something, she should be limited to the proportion that she contributed to the acquisition and maintenance of the properties.
Keller v. Prochey, 560 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. 1977); Bruck v. Howe, 71
S.D. 288, 23 N.W.2d 744 (1946); Stevens v. Anderson, supra.
Plaintiff presented no evidence concerning the amount she contributed, however, defendant's figures showed that his contribution
was substantially greater than plaintiff's.

Ex. 111.

If plain-

tiff is entitled to a distribution it must be reduced by the payments made by defendant after separation.

See Section IV of this Brief.
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As has been stated:

Unless otherwise agreedf a person
who has discharged more than his
proportionate share of a duty owed
by himself and another • . • is
entitled to contribution from the
other. Restatement, Restitutionf
§81 (1937).
CONCLUSION
There was no partnership.

If there was a partnership

any distribution should be pursuant to statute.

There is no

basis in the record to support the conclusion that the plaintiff
was only to provide services but that the defendant was to
provide the money.

In any event, defendant should be entitled to

his direct capital contributionsf and the other funds advanced,
before plaintiff receives anything.

An award to plaintiff under

these circumstances is contrary to the public policy of the State
of Utah.

Plaintiff did not come to court with clean hands, did

not contribute equally to the acquisition of the properties and,
in fact, amassed substantial wealth at the expense of defendant.
Equity should, therefore, deny plaintiff any relief.

The

judgment of the trial court awarding plaintiff one-half of the
properties must be reversed.
DATED this

Ifi

day of April, 1986.
Respectfully submitted,

^sJJMMMjLL

uoa/e^^

J. THOMAS BOWEN
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

day of April, 1986,

I caused four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be served on the Respondent by delivering
the same by hand to:
Bert L. Dart
Dart, Adamson & Parken
310 South Main - Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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GENERAL PARTNERSHIP

48-1-15

(2) When a person has been thus represented to be a partner in an
existing partnership, or with one or more persons not actual partners, he
is an agent of the persons consenting to such representation to bind them
to the same extent and in the same manner as though he were a partner
in fact, with respect to persons who rely upon the representation. Where
all the members of an existing partnership consent to the representation,
a partnership act or obligation results; but in all other cases it is the joint
act or obligation of the person acting and the persons consenting to the
representation.
History: L. 1S21, ch. 89, 416, &&
C. 1943,69-1-13,
There was no partnership or joint adventure by estoppel where one of the two alleged
joint adventurers had not given his consent
to "being held out as a joint adventurer with
the person making the representation, and
where the third person to whom the representation had been made had not relied upon
it Bates v. Simpson (1962) 121 U 166, 239 P
2d 749.
Partnership liability to mechanics1 lienors
was found where defendant had stated to
others he was or intended to become another's partner, and where he paid for a part of
the material used and was present during the
delivery and use of construction materials on

the premises. Buehner Block Co. v. Gleaos
(1967) 6 U 2d 226,310 P 2d 517.
That payment for goods was made by
check on the account of defendant, that
defendant waa sometimes listed as a pur*
chaser on the sales invoices, that defendant
signed applications for licenses to engage in
business with the state tax commission was
not sufficient basis for reversal of trial court
finding that defendant was not liable as a
partner in an enterprise by estoppel. Phillips
Manufacturing Co. v. Putnam (1973) 29 U 2d
69, 604 P 2d 1376.
Collateral References,
Partnership <£=» 24.
68 CJS Partnership { 21.
69 AmJur 2d 982 to 989, Partnership }( 67
to 76.

48-1-14. Liability of incoming partner. A person admitted as a part*
ner into an existing partnership is liable for all the obligations of the partnership arising before his admission as if he had been a partner when such
obligations were incurred, except that his liability shall be satisfied only
out of partnership property.
History: L 1921, ch. 89, 417; R.S. 1983 4
C. 1943,69-1*14,
Collateral References.
Partnership «=> 288.
68 CJS Partnership 1266.
60 AmJur U 123» Partnership 4 212.
Duty of one who joins with others aa partners or members of a joint adventure in the

purchase of property from a third person to
share with them the benefit of an existing
option or executory contract for the property,
152 ALR 1001.
Liability of incoming partner for existing
debts, 46 ALR 1240.
Right of one who accepts firm assets or
obligation upon account of an individual
indebtedness of, or transaction with, a partner, 50 ALR 4SL

48-1*15* Rules determining righto and duties of partners* The rights
and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules:
(1) Each partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way of
capital or advances to the partnership property, and share equally in the
profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities, including those to partners, are satisfied; and must contribute towards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to his share in
the profits.
19
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PARTNERSHIP

(2) The partnership must indemnify every partner in respect of payments made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the
ordinary and proper conduct of its business, or for the preservation of its
business or property.
(3) A partner who in aid of the partnership makes any payment or
advance beyond the amount of capital which he agreed to contribute shall
be paid interest from the date of the payment or advance.
(4) A partner shall receive interest on the capital contributed by him
only from the date when repayment should be made.
(5) All partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of
the partnership business.
(6) No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership
business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in winding up the partnership affairs.
(7) No person can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all the partners.
(8) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected with the
partnership business may be decided by a majority of the partners; but
no act in contravention of any agreement between the partners may be
done rightfully without the consent of all the partners.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, i 18; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943,69-1-15.
Construction and application.
An organization of workers, formed for the
purpose of performing and undertaking contracts for bricklaying jobs, did not have the
essential elements of either a general or limited partnership, where all the equipment
used by workers belonged to one individual
who had sole authority to make contracts for
himself and the organization, and where
workers were not entitled to share in profits
equally or on any fixed percentage basis,
were not chargeable for losses, nor permitted
to determine the means or methods of operating. Johanson Bros. Builders v. Board of
Review Industrial Comm. (1950) 118 U 384,
222 P 2d 563.
Extra compensation.
Where there was no express or implied
agreement existing aa to the partners' wagea
or compensation, it was not error for the
trial court to exclude evidence that one partner did more work than the other, for partners receiye no compensation for action in
the partnership business (other than splitting the profits) unless there was an express
agreement or provision for such remuneration. Keller v. Wixom (1953) 123 U 103, 255 P
2d 118.
Gifts to members of family.
Where father intended at the time of dissolution of family partnership to make a gift

to his son and wife of certain amounts of the
capital contributions he had made to the
partnership, and intended that such gift be
accomplished by each partner's sharing
according to respective partnership interests,
in the total assets of the partnership including the contributions made by the father,
and the other partners relied on such gift,
the intention of the parties was conclusive
and subd. (1) of this section was inapplicable.
West v. West (1965) 16 U 2d 411,403 P 2d 22.
Remuneration for services.
Where the partnership agreement or a specific practice, acquiesced to by the partners,
contemplates the payment of salary to one or
more partners, but no amounta are specified,
it is presumed that payment of reasonable
salaries is intended. Chambers v. Sims (1962)
13 U 2d 371,374 P 2d 841.
Generally, a partner is not entitled to any
remuneration for his services in the absence
of an agreement by the partners to that
effect Chambers v. Sims (1962) 13 U ad 371,
374 P 2d 841.
Sharing profits and leasee.
Although obligation to share losses is not
directly expressed in partnership agreement,
generally agreement to share profits, nothing
being said about losses, amounta prima facie
to agreement to share loasea also. Bentley •.
Brossard (1908) 33 U 396,94 P 736.
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48-1-37

48-1-36. Rights where partnership is dissolved for fraud or misrepresentation. Where a partnership contract is rescinded on the ground of
the fraud or misrepresentation of one of the parties thereto, the party entitled to rescind is, without prejudice to any other right, entitled:
(1) To a lien on, or right of retention of, the surplus of the partnership
property, after satisfying the partnership liabilities to third persons, for
any sum of money paid by him for the purchase of an interest in the partnership and for any capital or advances contributed by him; and,
(2) To stand, after all liabilities to third persons have been satisfied,
in the place of the creditors of the partnership for any payments made
by him in respect of the partnership liabilities; and,
(3) To be indemnified by the person guilty of the fraud or making the
representation against all debts and liabilities of the partnership.
History; L 1921, ch. SS, 9 8$ R.S. 1S83 4
C. 1943, 09-1-36.
Collateral Rafaranoaa,
Partnership 4fc» 26.
68 CJS Partnership f 13.

60 AraJur 2d 110, 119, Partnership i t 197,
207.
Right of on* partner to maintain action at
law against the other for damages from
wrongful dissolution of firm, 4 ALR 168.

48-1-37. Rules for distribution* In settling accounts between the partners after dissolution the following rules shall be observed, subject to any
agreement to the contrary:
(1) The assets of the partnership are:
(a) The partnership property.
(b) The contributions of the partners necessary for the payment of all
the liabilities specified in subdivision (2) of this section.
(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank in order of payment,
as follows:
(a) Those owing to creditors other than partners.
(b) Those owing to partners other than for capital and profits.
(c) Those owing to partners in respect of capital.
(d) Those owing to partners in respect of profits.
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order of their declaration in subsection (1) of this section to the satisfaction of the liabilities.
(4) The partners shall contribute as provided by section 48-1-15 (1) the
amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities; but if any, but not all, of the
partners are insolvent, or, not being subject to process, refuse to contribute, the other partners shall contribute their share of the liabilities, and
in the relative proportions in which they share the profits the additional
amount necessary to pay the liabilities.
(5) An assignee for the benefit of creditors, or any person appointed
by the court, shall have the right to enforce the contributions specified in
subsection (4) of this section.
(6) Any partner or his legal representative shall have the right to
enforce the contributions specified in subsection (4) of this section to the
33
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extent of the amount which he has paid in excess of his share of the liability.
(7) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for the
contributions specified in subsection (4) of this section.
(8) When partnership property and the individual properties of the
partners are in the possession of a court for distribution, partnership creditors shall have priority on partnership property and separate creditors on
individual property, saving the rights of lien or secured creditors as heretofore.
(9) Where a partner has become bankrupt or his estate is insolvent, the
claims against his separate property shall rank in the following order.
(a) Those owing to separate creditors.
(b) Those owing to partnership creditors.
(c) Those owing to partners by way of contribution.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 40; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-37.
Collection on partnership judgment.
Where partners conducted business without books and took money from partnership
for living expenses, partner couid not be
charged with money collected on a partnership judgment on dissolution of partnership,
in absence of evidence that it was appropriated to his own use for other than living
expenses. Buzianis v. Buzianis (1932) 81 U 1,
16 P 2d 413.
Credits.
Where contribution of one partner
exceeded that of other partner and he borrowed certain money from his wife for purpose of purchasing property for partnership,
on dissolution, he was entitled to credit for
such excess and for money borrowed,
together with interest, until date of termination of partnership. Buzianis v. Buzianis
(1932) 81 U l , 16 P 2d 413.
Descent and distribution.
Title to property which was in partner at
date of his death descends as real estate to
his heira subject only to equity of surviving
partner to have it applied primarily to trust
for which it was acquired. Bankers' Trust Co.
v. Riter (1920) 56 U 525,190 P 1113.
Goodwill.
A partnership of certified public accountants is of the same nature as a partnership
of attorneys or physicians and has no
goodwill to be accounted for as an asset upon
dissolution in absence of provision in partnership agreement relating to goodwill. Jackson v. Caldwell (1966) 18 U 2d 81, 415 P 2d
667.
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Where goodwill was not carried as an asset
on partnership books and partnership agreement did not contemplate that goodwill be
included in book value of partnership, it was
proper to exclude goodwill as an item requiring an accounting by one partner to another
upon dissolution. Jackson v. Caldwell (1966)
18 U 2d 81,415 P 2d 667.
Money in bank.
In determining respective rights of partners upon dissolution of partnership, it was
held that money in the bank, which receiver
had taken charge of, was improperly included
in the computation of total receipts. Wardrop
v. Harrison (1924) 63 U 132,222 P1069.
Money invested.
Where evidence supported finding that
partner sent money to Greece for purpose of
purchasing Greek francs, he was properly
charged with such money on dissolution,
together with interest to date of termination
of partnership. Buzianis v. Buzianis (1932) 81
Ul,16P2d4ia
Refunds to partnership.
Under contract dissolving partnership
engaged in obtaining refunds of excessive
freight rates paid to railroads, partner leaving partnership held entitled to percentage of
fee in certain case, which claim was pending
at time of dissolution, although refund
obtained was on freight bills paid after partnership was dissolved. Gallacher v. Foubert
(1934) 85 U13,38 P 2d 297.
Collateral References.
Partnership € » 300.
68 CJS Partnership i 385.
60 AmJur 2d 182, 198 to 208, 229, Partnership » 280,301 to 316,340.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBIN L. HOUGH,

t

Plaintiff,
vs

s

Memorandum Decision

t

JOEL E. COLLEY,

Civil No. DS2-3064

:

Defendant.

i

This matter was tried before the court
1985.

on

February

6,

Written arguments have been submitted by each counsel.

Both counsel have done ah exhaustive job in

researching

the

law and an excellent job in presenting the facts.
The parties
Texas,

in

commenced

August,

1972.

living
Both

together
were

in

students

initially that they could share expenses and
living together.

and

found

money

by

They grew up in an era when living together

was a vogue among many young people.
his

save

Galveston.

The defendant

obtained

medical degree and they moved from Texas to Pennsylvania

to Montana to Colorado and to Utah.
states

except

Utah

All

of

the

foregoing

recognize a "common law marriage11.

first issue before the court

is

whether

the

parties

The
have

formed a common law marriage in any one of the jurisdictions.
The elements of such a marriage appear
the

same

in

each

of

to

be

substantially

these jurisdictions, namely, <1) the

parties must have agreed between themselves
AR

to

be

married;

(2)

after such an agreement they must have lived together as

man and wifej and (3) they must have held themselves
the public as man and wife.

to

Certainly, in this case there is

no doubt that they lived together
court

out

as

man

and

wife.

This

finds that the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden

of proof as to the other two

elements

and

therefore

holds

that there is no common law marriage.
During their "relationship" the
substantial

real

parties

estate here in Utah.

have

acquired

The court finds that

as to this property the parties were partners with an
understanding
property.

that

they

agreed

were sharing equally in all of the

It was understood and agreed

that

the

plaintiff

would devote her time and talent to the property and that the
defendant would contribute money but that

both

would

share

«

50-50.

The

partnership property consists of the followingi

<1> 780 Northcliffe; (2) contract receivable on 1358 Roberta;
(3)

382

Leslie;

<4> 520 - 9th Avenue; <5) Deer valley lot;

(6) 231 Browning; (7) 514 East Wilson; 770
<8)

South

7th

East;

Flatfhead, Montana; <9> Hot Springs, Montana; (10) Nephi

land; and (11) Spring Creek property.

As to all other assets

the court finds that the parties acquired these in their sole
and separate property.
into

these

The court finds that

properties

by

the

any

defendant

contributions matched by the efforts of the

funds

were

put

capital

plaintiff.

All

of these properties should be liquidated and after paying any
obligations to third

parties

the

net

divided equally between the parties.
A6

proceeds

should

be

Under these circumstances neither

attorney's

fees

costs should be awarded to either party.
Dated this J_J__ day o-f March, 1985.
^ - 2 ^
~ WDearTl^. Conder,
District Judge..
Copies of the foregoing to be mailed to each counsel.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBIN L. HOUGH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO, D 82-3064

VS.

Hon. Dean E. Conder

JOEL E. COLLEY,
Defendant
The

above-entitled

on

the

in

person

ing

in

nesses
and

6th,

7th

on

regularly

for

trial

and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and defendant appear-

person

and

including

exhibits

by

the

having

been

submitted,

briefs

and

having

having

been

attorney, J. Thomas Bowen, and withaving

received

and

been sworn and testified,
and

the matter having been

the Court having received post-trial

entered

further

Memorandum

his

parties

and

the

came

and 8th of February, 1985, plaintiff appearing

argued

of

matter

its

argument
Decision,

Memorandum

Decision, and there

on the interpretation and content
the Court now being fully advised,

hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Texas,
and

The
in

money

parties

August

commenced

19 72.

living

together

in Galveston,

Both were students and shared expenses

by living together.

They moved from Texas to Pennsyl-

vania, to Montana, to Colorado and to Utah.

All the foregoing

onir-?'?
A8

states

except

resided

with

Utah
each

recognizes common law marriage.
other

until

late

October,

The parties

1981, when they

separated.

his
a

During

last

year

one-year

two
of

2.

of

of

Colorado

and

the

and

themselves
selves

quirements

in

to

be

to
of

a

her

of

public

common

at

Utah.

together,

filed

They

did

the

During

degree

as

law

of Pennsylvania, and

college

and

completed

the University of Texas,

University

property.

married

the

at

defendant

anesthesiology

lived

purchased

out

the

University

parties

period,

school

at

obtained

The

returns

medical

residency

plaintiff

Therapy.

nine-year

internship

years

the

the

did

in

University
this

time

Occupational

joint income tax
not

agree between

not sufficiently hold them-

husband and wife to meet the re-

marriage.

The

court

finds that

there was no common law marriage between these parties.
3.

During

substantial
property,

real
the

circumstances
total

tions

court

further

purchased
they

filed

the

in

the

state

finds

the

parties

each

effort

is

relationship,

estate

where

time,

partnership
parties

their

and

of

the

talents

evidenced

the

properties

for

fidelity

parties have acquired
of

Utah and as to this

were

parties
to
by
and

bonds

under

committed his or her

the

partnership.

the

manner

held
in

partners

This

in which the

title and applica-

which they reflected

their common ownership.
4.

The

parties

ceased

residing

together

on October 30,

1981.
-2-
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5.

On

divorce.
also

July

In

June,

alleged

and

30,

1983,

that

defendant

1982, plaintiff

a

plaintiff

partnership

filed

this

amended
existed

action for

her complaint and
between

plaintiff

which partnership plaintiff requested be dissolved

and that the assets of the partnership be equitably distributed.
6.
of

the

The

court

parties

finds

hereinafter

that

as

set

to the real estate holdings

forth

in

the

next following

paragraph,

the parties were partners with an agreed understanding

that

would

they

share

proceeds thereon.
would

devote

defendant

in

all

the

property

and the

It was understood and agreed that the plaintiff

all

would

equally

her

time

contribute

and

talents

money

but

to

that

the
both

property and
would

share

on an equal basis.
7.

The partnership property consists of the following:
a.
b.

780 Northcliffe, Salt Lake City, Utah;
Contract

receivable

at

1358

Roberta,

Salt Lake

City, Utah;
c.

382 Leslie, Salt Lake City, Utah;

d.

520 - 9th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah;

e.

Lot, Deer Valley, Utah;

f.

231 Browning, Salt Lake City, Utah;

g.

514 East Wilson, Salt Lake City, Utah;

h.

770 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah;

i.

Flathead, Montana;

j.

Hot Springs, Montana;

k.

Nephi# Utah;

1.

Spring Creek property.
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As

to

of

the

as

their

a

other

parties,

except
a

all

sole

as

the

and

to

in

court

acquired
finds

separate

properties

partnership
lot

assets

Cuernavaca,

the

parties

property

in

agreement

during the relationship

which

which

Mexico,

and

the

not

a

in partnership

parties

includes

and

acquired these

a

expressly had

half-interest

partnership

in

relating to

a duplex on the west side of Salt Lake City.
8.

The

signed

by

sharing
to

court

both

plan

be

parties

that

recognized

only

by

and

do

the

further

mortgages

valid.

defendant,

not

that

as

to

any

mortgages

for monies loaned by defendant's profit

said
as

finds

If

the

constitute

and

liabilities thereon are

there

court

are

mortgages

signed

finds they are self-serving

liabilities

against

the

partnership

assets.
9.
to
the
of

The

the

assets

trial
the

common

partnership
provided

of

this

parties
effort

agreement between the parties relating

to
and

in

case,
that

paragraph

and

above terminated upon

any contributions made by either

time

matched

7

should

by

the

be

deemed part of their

efforts and services of the

other party for which no further accounting should be required.
10.

Any

funds

put

into

the

partnership by the defendant

were capital contributions matched by the efforts of plaintiff.
From

the

foregoing

Findings

of

Fact, the court now makes

the following:

-4-

All

.

J--

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There

was

no

common law marriage between the parties,

and the parties are not husband and wife,
2.
relating
the

There
to

was

the

Findings
of

a

partnership agreement between the parties

real

properties

of

Fact,

which

the

trial

of

the

time

made

by

either

part

of

their

of

the

set

forth

partnership

this

parties

case,
to

in paragraph 7 of

was

and

that

terminated

at

any contributions

time shall be deemed

common effort matched by the efforts and services

of the other party for which no further accounting is required•
3.
after

All

the

properties

are

paying

any

obligations

to

ordered
third

to be liquidated and
parties,

net proceeds

are to be divided equally between the parties.
4.
based

Plaintiff's

upon

the

first

existence

cause of action and all other causes
of

a

common

law marriage should be

dismissed*
5*

No

attorney's

fees

or

costs

are

awarded

to either

party.

DATED this

v

' ¥

day of October, 1985.
BY THE COURT;
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBIN L. HOUGH,
Plaintiff,
J U D G M E N T
VS.
CIVIL NO. D 82-3064
JOEL E. COLLEY,
Hon. Dean E. Conder
Defendant.
The
on

the

above-entitled
6th,

7th

matter

came

on

regularly

for

trial

and 8th of February, 1985, plaintiff appearing

in person and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and defendant appearing
in

person

and

including
exhibits

by

his

the

parties

having

been

and

submitted,

and

having

attorney, J. Thomas Bowen, and witnesses
having

been

sworn

and

testified,

and

received and the matter having been argued

and

the

court having received post-trial briefs

entered

its

Memorandum

been

further

the

Memorandum

and

having

argument

on

Decision,

the
and

Decision,

interpretation

and there having
and

content

of

the court now being fully advised

made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.
of

action

Plaintiff's
based

upon

First
the

Cause of Action and all other causes
existence

of

a common law marriage

are hereby dismissed, with prejudice, no cause of action.

2.
relating
the

There
to

was

the

Findings
of

a

partnership agreement between the parties

real

properties

of

Fact,

which

the

trial

of

the

time

made

by

either

part

of

their

of

the

set

forth

partnership

this

parties

case,
to

was

and

that

in paragraph 7 of
terminated

at

any contributions

time shall be deemed

common effort matched by the efforts and services

of the other party for which no further accounting is required.
3.
after

All

the

properties

are

paying

any

obligations

to

ordered
third

to be liquidated and
parties,

net

proeeds

are to be divided equally between the parties,
4.

No

attorney's

fees

or

costs

are

awarded

to either

party.

DATED this

p

y Y

day of October, 1985.
BY THE COURT;
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